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Introduction: France and the EU: from
opportunity to constraint1
Emiliano Grossman
France’s relationship with European integration is traditionally complex and
characterized by regular ups and downs. Since the early days of European inte-
gration these relations have been punctuated by regular crises. The rejection of
the Constitutional Treaty at the French referendum of 29 May appears to signal
the beginning of a new phase. Yet this assertion is not self-evident. France has
usually had contradictory and unstable attitudes towards European integration.
In France, as elsewhere, European integration was subject to a ‘permissive con-
sensus’. European Union (EU) affairs were never central to political debates but
neither governing parties nor major interest groups or public opinion were
openly hostile to European integration. EU policy-making in France was
limited to negotiations among political, economic and bureaucratic e´lites. Argu-
ably this has changed since the early 1990s, as European integration has become
a more salient political issue.
Decrypting the result of the French referendum on the European Consti-
tution is not an easy task. Existing interpretations of the French ‘no’ present a
great variety of factors. While some focus on long-term trends, others stress
the importance of more immediate factors. Among those favouring more
immediate factors, some have argued that there was no need for a constitution
in the first place and that it could only confuse voters. Others, especially in
France, have seen the ‘no’ as a vote against the incumbent government.
While these latter factors are certainly important, this introduction will privilege
more medium and long-term explanations. To some observers, the EU may no
longer be perceived to be beneficial to France or to a majority of its population.
There are many rationalist accounts in international relations or in electoral
analysis that may support this explanation. A more constructivist explanation
advances the view that the ‘no’ is the result of the inadequacy between the
political discourse on the EU and political reality. The explanation that will
be developed in this introduction combines several factors. The single most
important change in relations between the EU and France has been the
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sudden awakening of French public opinion to EU issues in the wake of the
Maastricht Treaty ratification. The second crucial factor is the incapacity
and/or unwillingness of French political leaders to accommodate a changing
EU in domestic political discourse. Under these circumstances, the greater sen-
sitivity of public opinion to EU issues has made French EU policy-making
increasingly unpredictable. This is, thus, not a new problem but the European
Constitution is the most prominent victim of this situation to date.
In the rest of this introduction I ask whether Europe has ceased to be instru-
mental in achieving French goals. I then explain how the European game has
changed through the emergence of public opinion and voters as a fully-
fledged actor in French EU policy-making. Finally, I draw some larger
lessons from this discussion.
I. INSTRUMENTAL EUROPE?
Europe has historically been instrumental in a variety of ways to French political
e´lites. It has successively been used to solve domestic conflicts, push through
structural reform and as a means of blame avoidance. The instrumentality of
Europe has increasingly been challenged by various complementary changes.
Successive enlargements have challenged France’s central position in European
integration. Moreover, the more supranational elements in European inte-
gration have clearly been more difficult to accommodate to some of France’s
institutional and political features than for many other member states.
1. French leadership in question
In the run-up to the referendum, several representatives of the ‘yes camp’
declared that the ‘no’ victory would lead to a decrease in French influence in
EU affairs. This is in fact objectively true as the French share of votes would
have significantly increased, thanks to the new treaty (Baldwin and Widgren
2004; Yatanagas and Tsebelis 2005). Indeed, since the EU at 12, i.e. before
1995, France has lost more than one-third of its voting power in the
Council. Every enlargement naturally diminishes the relative vote shares of indi-
vidual member states. The 2004 enlargement has had a devastating effect on
French ‘power’. The Nice Treaty was supposed to stop the loss of power by
large states and anticipate the forthcoming enlargement under the leadership
of Germany and France. Yet the final result increased their voting shares only
marginally and the latest enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania has already
brought shares back to before-Nice levels. The Constitutional Treaty,
however, would have brought French votes back to their level after the 1995
enlargement, i.e. 11.6 per cent of votes as compared to 8.7 today (cf. Sauger
et al. 2007: ch. 4).
Obviously, decision-making practice in the EU and in the Council can hardly
be told by simply looking at formal decision-making rules. The question of
French leadership in the EU clearly goes beyond simple questions of the relative
984 Journal of European Public Policy
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vote weightings. Successive enlargements have led to a general questioning of
Franco-German leadership in the EU. Indeed, the new member states accept this
leadership with difficulty, joining the group of ‘small countries’ that expressed
their dissatisfaction at the Nice European Council in December 2001. The
new members appear to have strong disagreements on substantial issues as the
debates on the second Iraq War or on the Bolkestein Directive have shown.
Moreover, the Franco-German relationship was strained throughout the
1990s, as both states disagreed on an increasing number of issues, and in par-
ticular on the financing of the common agricultural policy (Cole, forthcoming).
Yet the Convention has been characterized by a serious attempt to revive the
Franco-German alliance. In fact, French officials had decided early on in
favour of a ‘German strategy’, mainly as an alternative to the Nice Treaty nego-
tiations. The result of the latter has come to be considered by most interested
parties – the French included – as a failure. The new strategy implied consider-
able efforts and substantive concessions on formerly non-negotiable issues such
as parity of votes with Germany (Jabko 2004: 282–3). The French ‘no’ may
thus also have consequences on this dimension, as such close co-operation
had been unheard of ever since the Kohl–Mitterrand period.
Finally, there has always been a particular vision of the ‘Grande Europe’ or
‘Europe puissance’ in France, i.e. a vision of Europe as a great power. This
vision implies a proactive foreign policy that represents a real challenge to the
US. It goes without saying that this foreign policy would and should be led
by France. Europe was seen as an opportunity to recover French grandeur
(Hayward 1996; Balme and Woll 2005). From that point of view the recent div-
isions on the Iraq War have clearly dealt a blow to this vision of Europe and of
France in Europe. Negotiations on common foreign and security policy (CFSP)
within the European Convention fell short of fulfilling French ambitions.
Finally, as both these episodes illustrate, enlargement has clearly increased
heterogeneity in the area of CFSP, thereby diminishing the chances for
French leadership in this area. Yet foreign policy continues to be part of a
rather large consensus in France across most major parties.
Under these circumstances, declining e´lite support or, at least, greater ambi-
guity among French political e´lites towards the EU, is hardly surprising. This
may point to a major disappointment with regard to France’s historical vision
of European integration. This has in turn fuelled existing divisions on Europe
within the major political parties on the right, at first, and on the left, more
recently.
2. Smoothing structural reforms and avoiding blame
Beyond the question of leadership, Europe has been instrumental to France as
an external incentive for reform. In particular, successive governments used
Europe to impose painful structural reforms, without taking full responsibility.
Support for the single market and economic and monetary union (EMU) has
responded to a variety of different and sometimes contradicting goals in French
E. Grossman: Introduction 985
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [F
NS
P F
on
da
tio
n N
ati
on
al 
de
s S
cie
nc
es
 Po
lit
iqu
es
] a
t 0
2:4
0 0
3 J
uly
 20
12
 
politics. The restructuring of the French economy has always been central to
those goals since the ‘turn’ in economic policy in 1983 (Hall 1986; Loriaux
1991). Thereafter, European integration has sometimes been presented as
‘heroic’ policy-making (Cohen 1992). But at least since the end of the 1980s,
European integration has regularly been used to impose or accompany measures
of liberalization. This has concerned a great variety of sectors ranging from
financial services, to transport and most public utilities. EMU forced France
to adopt strict financial discipline in the long term and to give up any
attempt to steer monetary policy. The Stability and Growth Pact durably insti-
tutionalized the criteria of ‘good governance’ in economic policy set out by the
Maastricht Treaty. Of course, as Howarth (2007) shows in this issue, in practice
things have been more complicated.
Europe was, in fact, one of the most fundamental instruments of reform.
It had and, to a lesser extent, continues to have substantial advantages.
First, it is far away and not very well known. Much of its legislation is
very technical and largely uncontroversial (Moravcsik 2002), though far
from insignificant. Larger and more significant measures have been chan-
nelled through single market legislation, such as the liberalization of electri-
city markets and the opening of other public utilities to competition. As the
procedure was never followed closely, this provided a ‘European screen’ to
potentially unpopular measures. Second, even if those measures came to be
known and picked up by the opposition, France’s partners at the European
Council were often ready to grant transitory measures or to accept longer
transposition periods, such as on the already quoted liberalization of electri-
city markets (Eising and Jabko 2001; see also Bauby and Varone 2007).
Moreover, changes were often slow enough to allow French firms or
former public monopolies to prepare for EU-wide competition (Culpepper
2006).
And this is precisely from where the major problems stem. As the number of
actors monitoring EU affairs increased, the signalling of EU issues and the gov-
ernment’s ambiguity became more costly. Individual entrepreneurs started
revealing hitherto secret or non-public bargaining strategies and package
deals. These are becoming increasingly problematic as the life of international
institutions becomes more exposed.2
II. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE NEW RULES OF
THE EUROPEAN GAME
The major recent change in France, and probably the single most important
change in France–EU relations, has been the emergence of public opinion in
debates on Europe in France. As has been shown by most in-depth studies,
French policy-making with regard to the EU is an e´lite-dominated process
with very little electoral salience (Lequesne 1993; Parsons 2003). Yet ever since
the Maastricht Treaty, public and media attention to EU affairs has significantly
increased.3 This has had lasting consequences for EU policy-making in France.
986 Journal of European Public Policy
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There is an ongoing debate on how the European issue is affecting political
cleavages. While some authors argue that the European issue can be absorbed by
the party system with little or no effects (Mair 2000; Marks and Wilson 2000),
others have argued that Europe does have the potential to profoundly restruc-
ture party competition in the member states (van der Eijk and Franklin
2004). In France, as elsewhere, anti-Europeanist parties have emerged since
the Maastricht Treaty. Yet those parties have never obtained any significant
votes except in European elections. Belot and Cautre`s (2004) argue, however,
that the EU dimension participates in the restructuring of the French political
space, and it seems that the increasing anti-European sentiment has a stronger
effect on voting behaviour in France than elsewhere (Andersen and Evans 2003).
In his contribution to this volume, Evans (2007) shows that people’s percep-
tion of the EU’s impact on social protection may be central to understanding
attitudes towards European integration. Yet those perceptions are hardly
unified and are unlikely, thus far, to generate any coherent political movement.
It is precisely this uncertain political weight of the European issue that may explain
why French Members of Parliament continue to leave EU policy-making largely
to the government, as Grossman and Sauger (2007) show.
Yet Europe is far from absent from the French public sphere. The major con-
sequence is heightened media and interest group attention to the impact of
Europe. Given that the EU has had a strong effect on policy areas, organized
societal actors of all kinds permanently monitor EU policy-making (Grossman
and Saurugger 2004). As Saurugger’s (2007) contribution shows, there is a great
variety of reactions to European integration among those actors. And it is pre-
cisely the actors who are most anti-European who are most likely to use more
contentious, and thus more visible, strategies of influence on EU issues. This
confirms what happens in the party system, where especially anti-European
parties pick up EU issues, while more pro-European parties tend to downplay
the issue. This is also confirmed in the case of agriculture. Roederer-Rynning
(2007) shows that farm lobbies continue to exert significant influence despite
a stronger state and an increasingly hostile political environment. Here too,
the persistence of a particular discourse appears to block significant change.
The European game has therefore become much more complicated for French
political e´lites to play. Europe has often been used as a means of blame avoidance
by government officials, as we have seen above. This has had lasting consequences
for the EU: it has become increasingly difficult to picture it positively. As
Schmidt (2007) explains in her contribution (see also Schmidt 2003), no politi-
cal grouping in France has managed to develop an efficient ‘communicative dis-
course’ on Europe. Put differently, there is no legitimizing discourse of European
integration adapted to the contemporary reality of the EU.
For the opponents of Europe and, to some extent, the opponents of the gov-
ernment in power, it has become simple to build on increasing anti-European
sentiment to mobilize opinion at European elections or referendums. Moreover,
different visions of Europe compete in the French political space. It appears that
even a significant number of pro-European voters on the left voted against ‘this
E. Grossman: Introduction 987
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [F
NS
P F
on
da
tio
n N
ati
on
al 
de
s S
cie
nc
es
 Po
lit
iqu
es
] a
t 0
2:4
0 0
3 J
uly
 20
12
 
Europe’, i.e. against a Europe considered to be too economic and not social
enough (Brouard and Tiberj 2006). Blame avoidance and the use of Europe
as a scapegoat have thus led to Europe being charged with all the real or sup-
posed negative consequences of economic adjustment, welfare state reform
and globalization.
In any case, it is unlikely that Jacques Chirac or the government of
Jean-Pierre Raffarin were completely unaware of this. It is even probable that
they would have preferred parliamentary ratification rather than ratification
by referendum. However, once the idea of a referendum was made public, it
was difficult for the government to stop this dynamic. Once the idea was
launched by former president and Convention chair, Vale´ry Giscard
d’Estaing, it developed its own dynamic. Very rapidly, indeed, the major oppo-
sition leaders, but also members of the majority, publicly supported the idea of a
referendum. The choice of the word ‘constitution’ by the Convention probably
gave an in-built impetus in favour of a referendum to the new treaty
(Saugeret al. 2007).
Beyond the referendum, the other policy examples examined here present
similar problems. Electricity liberalization is clearly caught between contradictory
goals and an ambiguous political discourse (Bauby and Varone 2007). The dis-
course on ‘gouvernance e´conomique’ suffers from a variety of diverging interpret-
ations, as Howarth (2007) explains. Independent regulatory agencies have been
set up in many different areas, but the actual strategies behind their creation differ
significantly from those in the UK, as Thatcher (2007) shows. The will to soften
the impact of liberalization and protect national champions led politicians to
adopt specific strategies. This ‘strategic ambiguity’ finally remains a characteristic
feature of EU policy-making in France, as most authors show.
III. THE CURRENT MALAISE AND THE FUTURE OF
FRANCE–EU RELATIONS
Much of the above analysis is shared by many observers and some political
actors. Yet there are some signs that current ambiguities are likely to be resolved
in the near future. The current malaise in France–EU relations is here to stay. At
best, European integration will participate in a painful learning process. At
worst, Europe will reinforce the already very strong ‘cultural’ cleavage in
French politics, weakening at the same time the classical left–right dimension
in French politics (Grunberg and Schweissguth 1997; Kriesi et al. 2006). In
this perspective, European integration may become one of the major indicators
of the ‘crisis of representation’ in France.
The contributions to this volume illustrate the current malaise and share a
similar analysis of the current situation. There continues to be a large consensus
in the political centre of the partisan system. Governmental, economic and
bureaucratic e´lites continue to support European integration. Yet as EU
policy-making becomes more exposed to public opinion, they have to learn
to justify their decisions better. For the time being, however, they usually
988 Journal of European Public Policy
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choose to keep EU-related issues as far away from the political agenda as poss-
ible. During the presidential election campaign in March 2007, the EU was
conspicuously absent from political debates, despite the 50th anniversary of
the Treaty of Rome. The two major candidates, Nicolas Sarkozy and Se´gole`ne
Royal, have not made any significant declarations on Europe since October
2006. It is true that Nicolas Sarkozy addressed the EU issue almost immediately
after his electoral victory. The idea of a shorter treaty that could be subject to
parliamentary approval only has led to a rather positive appreciation in other
European capitals. His stance on Turkey is rather softer than expected. At the
same time, he has also signalled support to French farmers.
All in all, French contradictions and ambiguities are likely to continue to be a
feature of EU policy-making. In the short and medium term, therefore, ‘heroic’
measures such as adopting a constitution or liberalizing services are likely to gen-
erate violent reactions, as they did in 2005. The alternative, which is apparently
the path chosen by the new president, is piecemeal change without great
salience. This may help France to continue implementing necessary reforms
in several areas, without threatening the integration process as a whole.
However, we have seen that it is precisely this kind of ‘privatized’ policy-
making that has left politicians unprepared for ‘socialized’ policy-making, to
use Schattschneider’s terms (1960). In the long term, domestic politics and
EU politics have to correspond better. Much of this, as Schmidt (2007)
argues in the opening contribution, has to do with developing an adequate com-
municative discourse. But it also has to do with individual citizens learning
interdependence.
The present volume tries to illustrate precisely those points. Earlier
attempts to account for this relationship and its evolution have adopted
either a very broad (Drake 2005) or a historical (Guyomarch et al. 1998)
point of view. This volume deliberately chooses to confront large perspectives
such as the discourse of political e´lites (Schmidt 2007) with detailed case
studies on critical policy issues such as agriculture (Roederer-Rynning
2007), the Stability and Growth Pact (Howarth 2007) or the liberalization
of electricity markets (Bauby and Varone 2007). It also focuses on more pro-
cedural changes related to the EU, such as the introduction of independent
regulatory agencies (Thatcher 2007). It finally discusses the role of and the
adjustment by specific actors: civil society (Saurugger 2007), public opinion
(Evans 2007) and political institutions (Grossman and Sauger 2007).
Parsons’ (2007) concluding contribution gives a broader view of the Europea-
nization literature and of how France and the present contributions may feed
into ongoing debates.
Biographical note: Emiliano Grossman is a senior research fellow at
CEVIPOF-Sciences Po and associate lecturer at Sciences Po Paris, France.
Address for correspondence: Emiliano Grossman, CEVIPOF, 98 rue de
l’Universite´, 75007 Paris, France. email: emiliano.grossman@sciences-po.fr
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NOTES
1 For comments on earlier versions of this introduction, I am grateful to Ben Clift,
Craig Parsons and Cornelia Woll. All remaining errors are, of course, mine. For
his collaboration on the whole issue, I am indebted to Craig Parsons. I also want
to thank the Editor and all the referees. Finally, a preparatory workshop was orga-
nized in Paris in June 2006, thanks to the financial support of Sciences Po and the
logistical support of CEVIPOF.
2 A similar point is made by Goldstein and Martin concerning negotiations at the
WTO (Goldstein and Martin 2000).
3 The only previous event that generated comparable public attention was probably
the European Defence Community in 1954 (Parsons 2003: 68ff.).
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